In contrast, a detailed treatment of expectations, and how these may be generated, lies at the heart of the current Neo-Keynesian analysis.
My own thesis is that this downgrading of the role of the monetary aggregates in current models, and in forecasting future inflation, has gone too far. At this point a couple of personal caveats may be in order. I am far from being a card-carrying monetarist. Not only did I strenuously oppose Friedman's monetary base control mechanism and his K% rule for monetary growth, but I have been credited, though without much justification, for example in The Times obituary of Milton Friedman, (November 17, 2006) , with having undetermined monetarism by pointing out the likely instability of demand for money functions when turned into targets. That said, I
was shocked when successive Conservative governments in the 1980s and 1990s could pass almost seamlessly from the view that control over broad money was the essential centrepiece of macro policy, the Medium Term Financial Strategy, to subsequently paying little, or no attention to monetary developments in later years.
By the same token I am concerned that some of the key features of a monetary, and of a truly Keynesian, economy are ignored in the neo-classical (neo-Keynesian) consensus.
A second caveat is that Woodford, and his supporters at the recent ECB Conference in Frankfurt (9/10 November, 2006) on 'The Role of Money', such as Uhlig and Gali had, I believe, two separate purposes. The first was to deny the benefit of having a separate monetary analysis, the famous two pillars of the ECB. In so far as monetary effects were important in preparing forecasts, and deciding policy, they should be integrated into a single, overall analysis of the prospects for the economy. I have no quarrel with this. It is the further second line of argument, that we can in practice virtually ignore developments in the monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary policy, focussing instead solely on a key policy determined interest rate, that I do want to question.
The starting point for Woodford (2006) In both the IS and the Phillips supply curve, expectations play a leading role; and whether they are forwards or backwards looking, rational or bounded, forms the core of a huge literature, but one which is not relevant to my thesis here. So I shall more simply write these as:-ỹ = y t -y* = f(Eỹ, R -Eπ) + u t 1 (IS)
where ỹ is the output gap, y is current real output, y* is the natural, or equilibrium, or sustainable level of output, R is the nominal interest rate, E is the expectations operator, π is the rate of inflation, and u and v are error terms. This is complemented by the Taylor type reaction function:-
Where π* is the target inflation rate.
Let me make two peripheral brief comments on this. First, it seems odd that the private sector is shown as responding to future expectations, but in equation 3 the Central Bank appears to be reacting only to current events. This latter is surely wrong. All inflation targeting Central Banks make, and respond to, inflation forecasts. I have tried elsewhere to show that a proper forward-looking specification of reaction functions can make a large difference to the estimated coefficients, (Goodhart, 2005 Be that as it may, this three equation model determines the level of interest rates, (real and nominal), the output gap, and both inflation and the price level, (given the inflation target and the starting point). The system has a determinate equilibrium, so long as the Central Bank reacts sufficiently strongly to inflation in adjusting nominal interest rates. There appears to be no need to look at what is happening to money in this system to achieve the main macro-economic variables of importance to social welfare.
In practice, however, money can be, and generally is, present in this model, since a demand-for-money function is fully consistent with the above three equations, as in
where P t is the price level and w t another error term. Note, however, that so long as the Central Bank sets interest rates, as is the generality, the money stock is a dependent, endogenous variable. This is exactly what the heterodox, PostKeynesians, from Kaldor, through Vicky Chick, and on through Basil Moore and Randy Wray, have been correctly claiming for decades, and I have been in their party on this. Certainly if the demand for money function fits perfectly, and if its arguments are correctly set out in equation (4), then you learn nothing more from looking at money, than you already knew from looking at inflation, output and interest rates.
There is a minor caveat to this, which is that money stock data, or elements of it, may come out earlier, or be less subject to (initial) measurement errors than data on output.
If so, M could act as an early indicator variable for y, or even for Py. There have been a few instances of such indicator relationships; for example fluctuations in cash holdings (and M0), at least for a time, seemed to precede movements in personal consumption in the UK. I would not, myself however, want to put much weight on any such leading indicator properties. A subsidiary argument is that it is really inflation, and not the statistics on the rate of growth of M3 or M4, that we really care about. So, even if there should be some effect of excess money balances, (in the sense of money balances well above that consistent with desired low inflation and sustainable output), on subsequent output and inflation, we can still wait to see if it does actually feed through into higher inflation, and then take countervailing action.
But even if one should agree with this 'wait and see' argument, the faster past growth of money should at least be a warning that the future monetary policy decisions of the Central Bank might need to be more restrictive, in the sense of higher interest rates held for longer, than might otherwise be the case. Furthermore the 'wait and see' position depends on a number of arguable propositions, for example, 1. that demand shocks to money holdings are much more prevalent (and longer lasting?) than supply shocks;
2. that lags between monetary policy action and its effect on inflation are short enough that one can afford to wait until inflation actually appears in the data;
and/or that the extent of monetary action necessary to stabilize inflation (once it has started -after a lag -to move away from target) will not then destabilize the financial system and/or the real economy;
3. that we can, and do, measure inflation correctly. That said, I doubt if anyone connected with monetary policy would deny the effect of the housing market, and of the equity market, on the forecast future for output and inflation. But why should we go any further than that, and link the process back to monetary growth specifically. This also raises the much debated issue of whether Central Banks, or anyone else, should be concerned about asset prices, except as they impinge on forecast values of real output and inflation.
Amongst the main arguments against using monetary policy to offset asset price fluctuations are:-I. that asset prices do not all move together in lock-step, and II. that a member of an MPC is never in a strong position, ex ante, to claim that any particular asset price is out of line with fundamentals (a bubble).
But so long as there is a reasonably close relationship between monetary growth and asset prices in general, at least over some periodicities, these objections can be side- Moreover nobody, and no firm, is liquidity constrained, ever. Indeed the conditions necessary for a no-default system to operate, either complete financial markets for every possible contingency or perfect information, are, I believe, identical to those that will allow a full Arrow-Debreu-Hahn Walrasian equilibrium to operate. As we know, money is not necessary in such a system. It is that constraint that modern Neo-Keynesian theory assumes away. Perhaps as we all become richer, and come to own more assets, such constraints will in practice bind less and less, and then money and commercial banks -and traditional Keynesian analysis -will indeed become less important. But I do not believe that that time has yet come. For a recent excellent empirical article on this, see Nier and Zicchino, (2006) . For the time being, the degree to which the current income, plus liquid asset, constraint bears on current expenditures depends to a considerable extent on the willingness of, and the terms on which, banks will lend to the private sector. This is a key reason why I believe that the rate of growth of bank lending to the private sector is as, or a more, important monetary aggregate than broad money by itself. Obviously it makes no real difference whether an established company sells a bond to, or raises a loan from, a bank, but a small company, or person, can usually only borrow from a bank, and then only in loan form.
So, shifts in bank willingness to extend such loans, as banks become more, or less, risk averse, will have the effect of shifting the constraints affecting the economy. In particular, when the growth rate of the money stock is declining, whole segments of the economy that were previously not income constrained may suddenly become so, and at a time when income is probably also dropping. Furthermore, when default becomes possible, risk premia come into play. There ceases to be one single interest rate, as in the basic Neo-Keynesian model, but a whole schedule of interest rates, depending on the perceived riskiness of the borrower.
Generally in depressions interest rates on safe, liquid government debt instruments decline, but risk premia rise. It can then be ambiguous whether, overall, interest rates have risen, or fallen. The reverse is true in booms; the official policy rate may rise, but risk premia may fall. Against this background it would be short-sighted not to cross-check for the combined effect that a combination of official policy measures and changing risk aversion may have by looking carefully at the time path of the monetary aggregates.
As Lord Peston asked (ibid), again in Chapter 1, "How far was the problem of [achieving and maintaining] full employment one of dealing with or failing to cope with risk and uncertainty." I agree, but a measure of the willingness to face such risk and uncertainty is given by evidence of the growth rates of the money and credit aggregates. Keynesian economics emphasised income constraints and risk and uncertainty. I have argued here that evidence on how the economy is coping with these factors can be given by examining the growth rate of the money and credit aggregates. In my view anyone who believes that default, risk aversion and income constraints matter, whatever brand of Keynesian or Monetarist, ought to concern themselves with the messages emanating from the monetary aggregates. To be sure 
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